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1. INTRODUCTION
It seems obvious that any attempt to forecast the future state of the
Euro-Atlantic relations should be based on the reminder of the past. It is also
crucial to stress that they have undergone a series of significant changes since
the end of the Cold War. During this period, as Ian Davidson observes: ‘‘[...]
no European country can have an independent defence policy if the potential
adversary is the Soviet Union; for fighting the Argentines in the South
Atlantic, perhaps, or the Libyans in Chad, but not for keeping out the
Russians. The independence of any European country is contingent on the
independence of its neighbours. Therefore the starting point for any European
defence policy is the concept of alliance.’’ (Davidson 1988: 151). That implied
the need for a strong political and military presence of the U.S.A. on this
continent, as all European armed forces combined were not a match for the
Soviet Army, if not supported by the U.S. military. That caused the situation
when any popular anti-American resentment (e.g. visible during so called
‘‘Easter marches’’ against the dislocation of American Pershing II and Cruise
missiles in Europe in the 80s) had to be disregarded by the governments of the
Western European states to keep Euro-Atlantic alliance valid and working.
During the Cold War any French attempts to diminish the role of
America in Europe would have been largely futile, as they were firmly
rejected by Bonn as not in tune with FRG interests. It was precisely
Washington’s leadership and supremacy in Europe, which made France
withdraw from the military structure of NATO in 1966 for almost 30 years:
‘‘It was deemed a contradiction of French sovereignty for the control of
French capital weapons and conventional forces to be under the command
and control of foreign generals and the influence of foreign governments.
[...]. Hence French sovereignty and national interests, as well as self-esteem
required that French leaders control French national security policy. Where
this required France working with NATO Allies it would so, but it would
not subordinate French interests to collective NATO command and control
under the dominant direction of the United States, assisted by Britain.’’
(Wyllie 1998: 97). Since 1966, France remained a member of NATO, but
withdrew from formal NATO’s institutions: Defence Planning Committee
(DPC), the Military Committee (MC) and Supreme Headquarters Allied
Powers Europe (SHAPE). This country has never fully accepted American
military and political dominance in Europe, treasuring much own soverei-
gnty, independence and national interests. This position was enhanced by
the possession of her own nuclear weapons perceived as the main warranty
of inviolability. The national pride of the former world’s superpower and
colonial state and self-perception of a unique country possessing civiliza-
tional mission to enlighten the other had probably something to do with
this anti-American stance. (see de La Serre, F. 1996: 19–39; Howorth
1997: 23–48). Using a term that is currently quite fashionable, when she
felt appropriate, France preferred to act unilaterally in order to show her
independence and power. However, Paris could have been quite content
seeing large U.S. military contingent in Western Germany, as a counter-
weight not only for the Russian troops, though perhaps the French were
not willing to express that openly. It seems that, fortunately for Western
Europe, a much needed and useful alliance – keeping the Americans in,
the Germans down, and the Russians out (Lord Ismay) – was right in
place, fulfilling its duties rather effectively. Global defence and security
issues were essentially monopolised by NATO – all other defence initiati-
ves were considered ineffective and secondary, including Western European
Union, which was defrosted only after the end of the Cold War, apparently
without a huge success. For almost half of the century this Euro-Atlantic
alliance successfully prevented war and maintained the sense of security
on the European continent.
The most important changes in the field of transatlantic cooperation are
obviously associated with the demise of the Soviet Union – sudden and
unpredicted outcome of Ronald Reagan’s strategy to exhaust the ‘‘Evil
Empire’’ by a political pressure, forcible arms race (including (in)famous
Star Wars) and proxy wars in Afghanistan, Nicaragua and Angola. The
by-product of Reagan’s policies was the emergence of Mikhail Gorbatchev’s
perestroika, which ended the short and brutish existence of the Soviet
Empire. That event shattered the whole international environment and
transformed not only European, but also global politics. The disintegration
of the communist system liberated Eastern and Central Europe from the
Soviet oppression and paved the way for rapid, peaceful and somewhat
unexpected reunification of Germany, followed by the much slower integ-
ration of the rest of Europe, to be partially completed only on May 1st,
2004. Global rivalry between capitalist and democratic West, under the
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leadership of the U.S.A., and Soviet Russia and its satellites, lasting almost
half a century, was finally over. The Soviet armoured divisions and tactical
nuclear missiles no longer effectively threatened Western European countries,
what essentially put into question the need for the strong transatlantic
military alliance (NATO) in general, and American presence in Europe in
particular. As Andrew Cottey notes: ‘‘In short, the end of the Cold War
posed fundamental questions not only about NATO’s future direction but
also about its very existence. As one observer put it, not only whither
NATO but also whether NATO.’’ (Cottey 1998: 44).
2. SECURITY DILEMMA AFTER THE END OF THE COLD WAR
This caused the emergence of the two important problems: first – whether
the U.S. was still much interested in European security issues; second
– whether the EU was able to develop independent and coherent security
policies and build capable military force apart from NATO. James H. Wyllie
had no doubts making his comment: ‘‘Today, as the threat in Europe has
steeply declined, greater threats and real competitive interests have
grown in other regions. America’s closest allies may still be in West
Europe, but the greater dangers challenging American strategic interests
are in the Middle East and East Asia [...]. A declining profile and
presence in West Europe does not indicate an American retreat from world
politics at the historic moment when it finds itself the world’s only super-
power, but other regions have overtaken Europe in the hierarchy of American
strategic interests. Official pronouncements have made this change of per-
spective clear. Since 1993 American defence planning has been predicated
on the priority to deter and fight two major regional conflicts almost
simultaneously and unilaterally if needs be. The regions of concern do not
include Europe. (emphasis added – RMM)’’ (Wyllie 1998: 80–81). This
effect was pretty obvious – in a foreseeable future Russia, or any other
European state alone, could not pose a serious threat to American interests.
At the same time, in East Asia such a threat could appear: China, a stable
and rapidly developing country was patiently building up its military and
political potential, and perhaps one day would be able to challenge American
dominance over this region (the test ground is, certainly, Taiwan). Japan,
despite its serious economic crisis, still was an economic superpower, which
had to be reckoned with. In the Middle East at least three countries – Libya,
Iran and Iraq – were pursuing anti-American policies after the end of the
Cold War. Though all were relatively weak, they were at least annoying
American policy-planners. In other regions, there were numerous ‘‘rogue
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states’’, which still did not want to acknowledge American hegemony and
were the centers of instability there. Their actions have included nuclear
proliferation (North Korea, Pakistan) which currently is perceived as the
greatest danger for U.S. security, when transnational terrorist groups like Al
Qaeda finally manage to get WMD. Hence, the position of a relatively
stable, prosperous and secure Europe simply had to slide down on the
American priority list. Immediately after the end of the Cold War the
nature of present threats for the security of this continent was unclear, so
newly created European Union could focus attention on internal reforms,
common economic projects, like establishing Single European Market and
the Economic and Monetary Union, as well as rather slow enlargement to
the East and South. Almost all Central and Eastern European states perceived
the European Union as a source of economic support, and NATO as
a military warrant – they used to think that these organisations were
complementary, not contradictory, and actively sought membership in both
of them. Hardly anyone there could imagine the situation that one day they
might face a tough alternative – either to support European core or to
support the U.S.A.
Unfortunately, terrible bloodshed in the former Yugoslavia proved that
not the whole of a European continent was violence-free and forced the
decision-makers to consider new security policies. By 1995 the Euro-Atlantic
record on the Balkan Wars was fairly unimpressive. Western Europe was
unable to react, partially due to the lack of resources, partially due to the
divergent interests of particular states, and the U.S. administration was
initially not interested in any major intervention. Western reluctance allowed
gross human rights violation in this region, including mass killings and
ethnic cleansing. Finally in 1995, when the U.S. administration decided to
act, NATO started ‘‘Operation Deliberate Force’’, which was aimed at
destroying a military infrastructure of Bosnian Serbs during the three weeks
of intensive air strikes. This military action forced the Serbs to sit at the
negotiation table and sign the ‘‘Dayton Agreement’’ (the General Framework
Agreement for Peace) in November 1995. Afterwards, 60,000 NATO-led
peacekeeping troops called ‘‘Implementation Force’’ (IFOR) entered the
region and monitored the fulfilment of the peace agreement’s obligations.
After successful implementation of the peace process, IFOR was replaced
subsequently by the SFOR – Stabilisation Force. Endangered NATO’s
credibility was therefore saved, and the unity of the West maintained for
some time. As Cottey rightly observes: ‘‘NATO’s experience in the conflict
suggested several important lessons for the Alliance’s future role in peace-
keeping and peace-enforcement: that attempts at peace – keeping are unlikely
to succeed (and may even be counterproductive) in circumstances where
there is no peace to keep; that indirect forms of pressure, such as ‘‘no fly
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– zones’’, have only limited effects in the absence of supporting ground
forces; that the Europeans lack the military resources to undertake peace-
enforcement operations without US support; that divisions can seriously
undermine the Alliance’s ability to respond effectively. (Cottey 1998: 51–52).
Americans draw a conclusion that if they want to carry out military mission
in a fast and effective manner, they should not wait till European govern-
ments define the lowest common denominator of their interests. These
Yugoslavian ‘‘lessons’’ revealed also another obvious thing – that European
states were unable to resolve even internal European problems without the
significant American military help, so Europe largely depended on Washing-
ton’s political will. So, if the U.S. refuses, Western Europe does not have
enough capabilities to perform peace-enforcing missions. As a result, the most
active European states decided to build such capabilities. However, this
process has met some very serious limits. As far as the economic co-operation
was concerned, member states agreed to give up the important functions of
their national sovereignty to the supranational institutions of the European
Union. But when close political cooperation was considered, EU countries
jealously kept their powers, so the whole process remained strictly intergove-
rnmental, making the second Pillar of the EU – the Common Foreign and
Security Policy – rather weak. This situation has been accurately described by
Christopher Hill as the capability – expectations gap – CEG. (Hill 1993). On
the one hand, there was a wide demand for a more active role of the EU in
the world affairs, on the other, the EU did not have capabilities to fulfil these
expectations smoothly. In 1998 the ‘‘inventor’’ of the CEG, presented an
article Closing the capabilities – expectations gap trying to sum up important
changes which took place since 1993 on the CFSP field. He has noticed that:
‘‘[...] the conclusions is irresistible that while there has been some ameliora-
tion of resources, instruments and cohesiveness, and some foundations have
been laid for further improvements, the fundamental insufficiency remains.
Indeed, with future enlargement, bringing more budgetary pressures and
complications of decision – making, and the IGC not having initiated
radical change, the available capabilities for foreign policy may well
diminish. The EU continues to impress more in potential then in action.’’
(Hill 1998: 29). And he concludes: ‘‘The CEG has not gone away; it will
probably never do so (emphasis added – RMM), even if it is highly
desirable that European foreign policy – makers should realise the dangers of
hubris and scale down their ambitions to remake international relations – the
besetting and tragic flow of American policy, after all.’’ (Hill 1998: 37–38).
The discussions over this issue instantly brought the question of limiting
American dominance and diminishing NATO’s role in the European security
issues. This became a subject of controversies both within the EU and
between the EU and the U.S. – close American allies (United Kingdom, the
Euro-Atlantic Relations After the Enlargement of the EU 27
Netherlands) intended to keep American leadership in NATO, some other
countries (predominantly France) tried to diminish it. At the same time the
U.S. administration attempted to play a sensitive game – to enhance
European military capability in the region and not being superseded by the
EU on this field, what could lead to loosing its dominant position. Conflict
in the former Yugoslavia sparked some visible tensions both inside Europe
and between the European states and America over the use of force. These
tensions and rows could have also been observed during NATO intervention
in Kosovo in 1999, but transatlantic alliance managed then to limit the
repercussions. However, the overall result of NATO’s operation in Kosovo
is not very convincing. Though this foreign intervention effectively stopped
numerous atrocities committed there, this region seems to remain in a dead-
lock – still it is not clear what will be the future of this region and who
ultimately will rule this land, as it is rather hard to expect that current
Western protectorate will last for ever.
3. 9/11 ATTACK AND ITS CONSEQUENCES
Another huge catalyst for growing transatlantic rifts emerged after
September 11, 2001 attack and American response to it. This ‘‘punch in the
face of the American hegemon’’ (as it was frequently called, especially
through the Middle East) has been noticed with shock and awe by the
American nation, and with declared sympathy towards the victims by the
large part of the world. However, there were some places in the world,
where these attacks were met with open joy and support, and European
solidarity with America somewhat vanished and was superseded by the
feeling of shadenfreude. ‘‘Why do they hate us?’’ and ‘‘what went wrong?’’
were the most frequent questions in the USA, as ordinary Americans seemed
not to know the answers. They finally encountered the fact that even after
the end of the Cold War America had an enemy clever and resourceful
enough to make a significant harm. However, a large sector of the world’s
public opinion (as well as some notorious American authors like Noam
Chomsky (2001, 2003), Gore Vidal (2002) or Michael Moore (2003) did
have some hints on the root causes of the resentments leading to this
savage, anti-American attack. It was the U.S. government itself to be blamed
for what happened on 9/11. It was U.S. power, arrogance, annoying unilate-
ralism, ruthless exploitation of the world’s resources (most notably, Middle
Eastern oil) and, last but not least, support of Israel against the Palestinians,
which had caused resentments leading to this outrageous act of barbaric
atrocity. In the eyes of the radical (and sometimes even not so radical)
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intellectuals and large sector of the World’s public opinion (especially in
the Muslim countries, but also in Western Europe and even America), the
perpetrators of these cruel attacks were at least partially validated by the
presumed atrocities committed by the Imperialist U.S.A. to the rest of the
world. (see: Scraton 2002; Letter from United States Citizens to Friends in
Europe) America’s greatest current sin was hidden under the banner of
globalization, which apparently concealed the enormous (and evil) influence
exerted by the American civilization. ‘‘Globalization’’ was frequently presen-
ted as the aggressive spread of essentially American values and ways of
life, trade and government over the globe, as if it was a ‘‘natural’’ and
inevitable process, excluding any coercion. A critical approach to that concept
and its deconstruction presumably revealed cultural, economic and political
neocolonialism and imperialism standing behind it, as well as a coercive
nature of this process – it was perceived as a forceful Americanization of
the world – forcing the rest to accept Western – alien to them values.
Therefore, it should not come as a surprise that soon after 9/11, the U.S.
government received advice from engaged intellectuals to turn the other
cheek to the masters of the terrorist attacks, and meet their demands based
on legitimate grievances (do not attack the Taliban, stop supporting Israel,
withdraw from the Middle East, spare Saddam, halt globalization etc.).
Sometimes it seemed that nothing short of total and final self-rejection of
any political and cultural influence exerted by the U.S.A. on the world,
could win the hearts and minds of the pacifist European public opinion,
French and German leaders and columnists included1. Though immediately
after 9/11 many governments of Western European countries hurried up to
declare verbal support, at least some of them did it apparently in order to
have a minimal control of the superpower prospective actions, and possibly
to curb them. All in vain, as contrary to these voices, the Bush administ-
ration, led by the neocon desire to change the world rather than to understand
it, invaded Afghanistan and quickly ousted the Taliban regime, what left Al
Qaeda without a base. The U.S. government soon declared, with outrageous
sincerity, that this country no longer be a benign hegemon and would
actively pursue its harsh security policies. The Americans started to perceive
a whole world as a battleground for their fight with the terrorist groups
hidden under the banner of Al Qaeda. Bush jr, was clearly following
Ronald Reagan, who after a decade of rather uncertain foreign policy,
successfully achieved the democratic transformation in Central and Eastern
Europe, surprising many experts (so called sovietologists), who used to
1 Jean-Marie Colombani, the author of the famous article Nous Sommes Tous Américains
published in Le Monde next day after 9/11, has soon written a book showing a little bit
different attitude towards the USA: Tous Américains? Le monde après le 11 septembre 2001,
Fayard, Paris 2002.
Euro-Atlantic Relations After the Enlargement of the EU 29
forecast a longstanding well-being of the USSR. Enormous economic,
political and military pressure on the Soviet system led to its subversion
and the collapse of the Soviet State. Surely, it is worth mentioning here that
this transformation seemed to be much an easier task in comparison, as the
large parts of the Eastern European public desperately awaited American
liberation, which is definitely not the case when we consider the population
of the Middle East. While huge sectors of Polish, Czech or Hungarian
societies have felt they were actually oppressed by the Soviet domination,
a lot of people in the Middle East believe that their real oppressor is the
U.S.A. itself, so they do not need more American presence there. Hence, it
is not yet clear whether American military and political pressure succeeds
with the transformation of the Greater Middle East, a clear goal of current
American foreign policy.
In Washington, Western European support was considered insignificant,
what was a clear result not only of a current unilateral mood, so fashionable
today in the D.C. corridors of power, but also of the Bosnia and Kosovo
lessons. Former experience strengthened the disdain for asking ‘‘Europe’’ or
‘‘the World’’ for their permission for U.S. action in Iraq. The people standing
behind the terrorist attacks were labelled evil doers and mad fanatics,
deprived of any popular support, what made the impression that Bush
administration was not interested at all in countering the presumed motives
of terrorist actions, and limited itself to targeting the perpetrators and those
who supported them. Some of the U.S. officials have even uttered that the
war on terrorism could be finally and decisively won (by the simple
extinction of terrorists and their base) – the clear result of an approach
chosen by them to ‘‘explain’’ terrorists’ actions. (Frum and Perle 2003).
Unfortunately, this vision of an isolated enemy of America, lacking any
wider support or sympathy is far from being true. The sheer scale of
anti-American resentments, so much visible today on every continent, has
indicated that many governments and/or societies are willing to reject, or at
least limit, the influence exerted by this country. Even if they did not
openly support violent attacks against America, they felt no constraint to
justify these attacks, and at least partially exculpate the perpetrators.
Interestingly, large parts of Western Europe, most notably France and
Germany, have formed ‘‘moderate’’ anti-American camp in the UN Security
Council, widening Euro-Atlantic gulf already existing there since the end of
the Cold War. Many European intellectuals claimed that it was the U.S.A.
and its imperial zeal, not Al Qaeda, which posed the greatest and real
danger for the world’s stability and security. German governing elites cleverly
utilised pacifism and growing anti-Americanism of its population to prevail
in the upcoming parliamentary elections, and actively supported French
policy to constrain Washington’s violent actions. In these two countries (as
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well as in the U.S.A.) articles predicting the inevitable fall of the ‘‘American
Empire’’ were hugely popular. (Todd 2002). Some other books, which
became bestsellers, were suggesting that the CIA (and surely Israeli Mosad)
were the true, deeply hidden puppet masters of these attacks, crafted
to justify the future acts of U.S. aggression (or even that the whole
‘‘9/11 affair’’ had been fabricated – see Meyssan 2002, Wisnewski 2003).
Franco-German efforts to stop American war against Saddam were soon
joined by Russia, dreaming about the ‘‘multipolar’’ world, where the in-
fluence of the sole superpower was effectively curbed by the coalition of
the local powers and, albeit with some reluctance, by China. This cannot
come as a surprise – those states even previously hinted the need to limit
U.S. influence. As Michael Glennon interestingly observes: ‘‘Reactions to
the United States’ gradual ascent to towering preeminence have been
predictable: coalitions of competitors have emerged. Since the end of
the Cold War, the French, the Chinese, and the Russians have sought
to return the world to a more balanced system.’’ (emphasis added
– RMM) France’s former foreign minister Hubert Vedrine openly confessed
this goal in 1998: ‘‘We cannot accept... a politically unipolar world,’’ he
said, and ‘‘that is why we are fighting for a multipolar’’ one. French
President Jacques Chirac has battled tirelessly to achieve this end. According
to Pierre Lellouche, who was Chirac’s foreign policy adviser in the early
1990s, his boss wants ‘‘a multipolar world in which Europe is the counter-
weight to American political and military power.’’ Explained Chirac himself,
‘‘any community with only one dominant power is always a dangerous one
and provokes reactions.’’ In recent years, Russia and China have displayed
a similar preoccupation; indeed, this objective was formalized in a treaty
the two countries signed in July 2001, explicitly confirming their commitment
to ‘‘a multipolar world.’’ President Vladimir Putin has declared that Russia
will not tolerate a unipolar system, and China’s former president Jiang
Zemin has said the same. Germany, although it joined the cause late, has
recently become a highly visible partner in the effort to confront American
hegemony. Foreign Minister Joschka Fischer said in 2000 that the ‘‘core
concept of Europe after 1945 was and still is a rejection of [...] the
hegemonic ambitions of individual states.’’ Even Germany’s former chancellor
Helmut Schmidt recently weighed in, opining that Germany and France
‘‘share a common interest in not delivering ourselves into the hegemony of
our mighty ally, the United States.’’ (Glennon 2003).
Any remaining sympathy towards America finally ended, when the Bush
administration had decided to wage a war against Saddam Hussein and his
oppressive regime, not only in order to capture rich oil fields there, but also
to start a radical transformation of the whole region towards some form of
a participatory political system, providing a minimum of freedom for its
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inhabitants. Ironically, the idea that democracy may be brought to the
Middle East on the American tanks, has been rejected by many European
intellectuals as the Neo-Bolshevism; they eagerly used this opportunity to
de(con)struct it and reveal the real motives of the American aggressors
– primarily their greed for oil and the will to conquer the world. (see e.g.
Todorov 2003). This war has provided a perfect opportunity for all peace
lovers to justify the thesis that the real oppressors are usually the Americans,
driven by their murky interests and ready to subject all other countries to
their neo-colonial will. Objecting political elites received huge support from
their citizens, taking part in many loud and widely broadcasted protest
marches, organized along Western Europe. Ultimately, after a decade of
hidden but growing tensions, the ‘‘Old’’ Europeans managed to detach
themselves from an alliance with the country, which successfully guarded
their territorial integrity against the Soviet Union since 1945 (through
NATO), and supported the slow process of economic and political unification
with money (Marshall’s Plan) and tacit political support. What was impos-
sible during the Cold War, when the political leaders of the European
societies firmly attached themselves to the leadership of America, is clearly
possible now, when they tend to limit the American power. The clear result
of this message, so widespread in the European media is that today,
according to a recent EU opinion poll, European public deeply believes that
only Israel outstrips the U.S.A. as a country posing the greatest threat to
world’s stability.
It seems that both the majority of European political and intellectual
elites, and the European public prefer to suggest that actions mounted by
the warriors of jihad and their followers are now directed solely against
America, its power and culture, and they try to forget French bloody
experience with Islamic terrorism from the middle 90s. They want to believe
that Al Qaeda is fighting not with the West, but with America and Israel.
Even Madrid and London bombings were frequently interpreted as a punish-
ment for the pro-American policies developed by the then Spanish and
current British governments, which actively supported U.S. occupation of
Iraq. That feeds the illusion that disengagement from America can win the
hearts and minds of the Islamic terrorists and their sympathisers and,
consequently, would secure these populations from the terrorist threat. They
also seem to think that ideas and practices forwarded by America are
significantly different from those originated from the Old Continent. This
latter view received a powerful support from an American neoconservative,
Robert Kagan who claimed that ‘‘the Americans are from Mars and the
Europeans are from Venus’’ (Kagan 2002). Influential intellectuals on the
both sides of the Atlantic have started to believe that growing transatlantic
tensions over Iraq allow them to bury the concept of the ‘‘West’’, traditional-
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ly consisting of (Western) Europe and (Northern) America, based on social
practices and institutions coming from a long and common, albeit frequently
violent, history.
4. CLASHES OVER U.S. INTERVENTION IN IRAQ
So far, the most visible tensions were to be observed in the UN Security
Council, where U.S. administration clashed not only with China and Russia,
but primarily with France and Germany, over the UN resolution allowing
America to use force to oust Saddam. As we know, ultimately U.S. officials
failed to persuade their opponents to accept such a resolution. Surely, it
does not mean that the whole Europe decided to oppose the U.S. administ-
ration. The governments of Great Britain, Italy, Spain, Poland and Portugal
openly supported American actions in Iraq. It is worth mentioning, however,
that the majority of the population of these states did not support their
leaders – their attitude was much better expressed by President Chirac and
Chancellor Schroeder. The result is that these pro-American leaders have
already lost their offices (like Spanish Prime Minister Jose Maria Aznar and
Polish PM Leszek Miller) or are about to loose them soon (Tony Blair).
M. J. Glennon interestingly describes these events: ‘‘[...] in pursuing
power, states use those institutional tools that are available to them. For
France, Russia, and China, one of those tools is the Security Council and
the veto that the charter affords them. It was therefore entirely predicta-
ble that these three countries would wield their veto to snub the United
States and advance the project that they had undertaken: to return the
world to a multipolar system. During the Security Council debate on Iraq,
the French were candid about their objective. The goal was never to disarm
Iraq. Instead, ‘‘the main and constant objective for France throughout the
negotiations,’’ according to its UN ambassador, was to ‘‘strengthen the role
and authority of the Security Council’’ (and, he might have added, of France).
France’s interest lay in forcing the United States to back down, thus
appearing to capitulate in the face of French diplomacy. The United States,
similarly, could reasonably have been expected to use the council – or to
ignore it – to advance Washington’s own project: the maintenance of
a unipolar system. ‘‘The course of this nation,’’ President Bush said in
his 2003 State of the Union speech, ‘‘does not depend on the decisions of
others.’’ The likelihood is that had France, Russia, or China found itself in
the position of the United States during the Iraq crisis, each of these
countries would have used the council – or threatened to ignore it – just as
the United States did. Similarly, had Washington found itself in the position
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of Paris, Moscow, or Beijing, it would likely have used its veto in the same
way they did. States act to enhance their own power – not that of potential
competitors. That is no novel insight; it traces at least to Thucydides,
who had his Athenian generals tell the hapless Melians, ‘‘You and
everybody else, having the same power as we have, would do the same
as we do.’’ This insight involves no normative judgement; it simply
describes how nations behave. (emphasis added – RMM)’’ (Glennon 2003).
Iraqi case is an interesting exercise of realpolitik in the post-Cold War
world: an attempt to trammel the one and only remaining superpower (or
even hyperpower in French parlance) by the coalition of willing, though not
mighty. It was also pretty clear that these efforts were bound to fail – it
was simple unrealistic to use the international law to block U.S. actions, as
current Washington’s administration frequently proved it did not think that
international organisations could subvert its sovereign right to act indepen-
dently, when in need. Glennon presents an interesting prediction of the
future events: ‘‘If the war is swift and successful, if the United States
uncovers Iraqi WMD that supposedly did not exist, and if nation-building in
Iraq goes well, there likely will be little impulse to revive the council. In
that event, the council will have gone the way of the League of Nations.
American decision-makers will thereafter react to the council much as they
did to NATO following Kosovo: Never again. Ad hoc coalitions of the
willing will effectively succeed it. If, on the other hand, the war is long and
bloody, if the United States does not uncover Iraqi WMD, and if nation-
building in Iraq falters, the war’s opponents will benefit, claiming that the
United States would not have run aground if only it had abided by the
charter. But the Security Council will not profit from America’s ill fortune.
Coalitions of adversaries will emerge and harden, lying in wait in the
council and making it, paradoxically, all the more difficult for the United
States to participate dutifully in a forum in which an increasingly ready
veto awaits it.’’ (Glennon 2003).
The result was that the Euro-Atlantic atmosphere was significantly
spoiled, and many European states had to decide – either they were with
U.S. or with the Franco-German tandem supported by China and Russia.
Some governments decided to support the European core (Belgium, Luxem-
bourg), some, mentioned earlier, decided to support America. The choice of
their societies, however, was pretty obvious – the majority of them was
against the invasion on Iraq and showed their attitude during loud and
well-publicised protest marches in the streets of the numerous European
capitals.
The recent enlargement of the European Union has increased the comp-
lexity of transatlantic relations in this respect that it enlarged the conflicting
camps within the EU. Some states, most notably Poland and the Baltic
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republics – Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia, consider active U.S. presence in
Europe as a chief guarantor of their newly regained independence. Hence,
from their perspective, NATO is the main vehicle for truly effective defence
and security policies, valuable precisely because this organisation implies
close relations with the U.S.A. The European Union is still perceived
primarily as an economic organisation, providing financial assistance to the
new members and having rather scarce defence and security assets. It seems
that these states have treated ambitious plans for any closer and deeper
political cooperation within EU (including truly common foreign and defence
policy), with some scepticism and reluctance, because they are not sure
whether it is aimed at the reduction of American presence in Europe. These
states, observing clashes over Iraq in the UN Security Council, were
confronted with an intriguing question – how could they trust that these
European states, which were actively cooperating with Russia (former
totalitarian Eastern Europe oppressor) and China (still an authoritarian state)
to block American (still Western liberal democracy) action to subvert the
tyrannical regime, ruthlessly harassing its own population, would ever act in
their defence, if there was such a need (even if currently it seems to be
highly unlikely). They believed that it was the U.S. which was willing to
use the military force to forward its vital interests, so it would be better for
them to support this country. They hope that the sphere of American
interests includes their region and would shelter them against some external
enemy, when this is the case. Their perception of possible security threats
in Europe is significantly different than the perception of Western European
states, which strongly believe that it is simply unrealistic to expect in the
future any hostile attempt against any EU state. It cannot come as a surprise
that the biggest of them – Poland – the country which stubbornly supported
the U.S. actions in Iraq, earned a well-deserved nickname American Trojan
donkey in the German press (apparently, slightly nobler animal – a horse
– is reserved for the Brits), and annoyed the French President, Jacques
Chirac to that extent that he could not help himself of giving them a valuable
and pretty rude advice to be quiet when (the mafia-styled) ‘‘members of the
family’’ were quarrelling.
Some other CEECs, during the diplomatic row over Iraq, decided to
follow this advice of the French President and used this opportunity not to
express their views. When, after the failure of the Brussels summit in
December 2003 (due to the opposition of Spain and Poland), France and
Germany mentioned their willingness to build two speeds Europe unless the
constitutional treaty was to be accepted, they promptly declared their will to
join the European core. They have probably assessed that cohesive and
politically integrated United Europe will significantly transform the security
dilemma on the continent. When Prague or Budapest is considered as
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European as Paris or Berlin, none would ever plan to attack them. They
probably expected the ultimate decline of the American influence over
Europe and preferred to side themselves with the major decision-makers
there. It seems that the ‘‘New’’ Europe is also pretty divided, as far as the
transatlantic relations are concerned. Some states are going to support the
‘‘British’’ tradition of keeping America in, trying to built there own version
of the special relations, some other are willing to join the old French plan
to build the European Union as a counterweight to America in a new, truly
multipolar world.
The rift between the two sides of the Atlantic seems to be an obvious
and inevitable result of the end of the global rivalry between the U.S. and
Soviet Union 15 years ago (due to the demise of the latter). Potential Soviet
threat firmly kept both sides of the Atlantic united in their resistance, what
gave them a ground for common political stance, when necessary. It cannot
come as a surprise: lack of a common enemy is a frequent cause for
disentaglement in human societies. Now, when this uniting threat has long
been gone, both sides are prone to perceive each other as potential com-
petitors in the global economic struggle, which superseded former ideological
and military conflict, framing the globe during the Cold War. Integrational
processes in Western Europe, which now include Central and Eastern Europe,
are providing European Union with a unique opportunity to make itself
independent of the American protection. Soviet Empire no longer endangers
the security of Europe, so it does not need American military shelter anymore
(though new, assertive Russia will try to exert as much influence as it is
possible using its primary weapon – gas, this time not to conquer Western
Europe, but to control this continent). This continent has to strive with its
own power (economic) and weakness (demographic, political and military),
particularly with the newly reunited Germany, this continent’s colossus,
being in the past frequently a European troublemaker and, even more
importantly, with the influx of immigrants, who instead of adjusting them-
selves to the European society intend to adjust Europe to their culture.
Current U.S. administration is no longer willing to support the deeper
integration of this continent as it may create a serious challenger to the
project of a new American century. Hence it is trying to use some ‘‘Old’’
and some ‘‘New’’ European countries, known for their unconditional support
for the U.S. actions, to slow this process and diminish the closeness of the
economic and political bonds. On the other side of the Atlantic, there are
those willing to build a new European identity on the anti-American
fundament, following the vision of the two famous European philosophers:
Jacques Derrida and Jurgen Habermas (accidentally being of the French
and German origin). As Dominique Moisi interestingly observes: ‘‘It is
as if, divided over its institutional and geographic future, Europe
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feels that it must exist as an alternative to the United States – a dif-
ferent and better West. European intellectuals, such as J. Habermas and
Jacques Derrida, see in the recent antiwar demonstrations the emergence
of a European civil society that chooses to define itself negatively against
the United States. It is unfortunate that Europeans have not chosen to
define themselves positively in the name of a clear project from Europe.
Unlike anti-American sentiments in the past, this breed of anti-A-
mericanism is not so much a reaction to what the United States
does as a reaction to what it represents. Although French President
Jacques Chirac was clearly not speaking in the name of most European
governments when he spectacularly opposed the United States over
the war in Iraq, he was in tune with European public opinion. (e-
mphasis added – RMM)’’ (Moisi 2003).
5. THE END OF THE WEST?
It seems that as long as the European ‘‘core’’ is going to exploit this
growing anti-Americanism of the large sector of the European public to
forward futile plans to build the superpower to counterweight America, and
the U.S. administration is going to treat the European Union as a challenger
and, consequently, tries to sideline Europe, the Euro-Atlantic relations will
remain where they currently are, or even deteriorate. Both attempts seem to
be rather utopian and cannot be consider as the promising political projects
– neither European Union will manage to be soon a serious contender to the
almost-omnipotent power of the U.S.A., nor America will manage to ignore
the position of Europe, whatever it is. But, as a result of these reckless
actions of both sides, the transatlantic rift may grow even larger, and the
division on the European ‘‘core’’ (led, obviously, by the Franco-German
alliance joined by the coalition of willing to support their project) and
‘‘peripheral’’ states, consisted of those who are not happy with the aforemen-
tioned leadership in Europe (and less economically integrated) may finally
consolidate. The revival of the concept of Europe of ‘‘concentric circles’’ or
‘‘two speeds’’, immediately after the failure of the December 2003 EU
summit in Brussels, is particularly significant. This summit showed that
Europe was divided over the Franco-German leadership and its project for
this continent’s prospective role and functions. Further rejection of the
Constitutional treaty in the referenda in France and Holland even increased
the mess, so the nearest future of the European Union is not clear – it does
not know neither its own structure and legal basis nor its borders (enlarge-
ment – the case of Turkey) – current solutions are temporary, but no one
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knows what kind of more permanent project will be accepted, if any.
Moreover, this continent is doomed to face demographic crisis leading to the
deep reconstruction of its population – it’s hard to believe today that, first,
the growing number of relatively young pensioners allow to keep economic
growth in the long term and, second, the increasing pressure from the
immigrant population, prevalently Muslim, is not going to lead to more social
and cultural tensions, not only in the suburbs of European cities. It seems
that within the next decade both Europe and the European Union will be
facing a huge number of considerable challenges (structural, social, demogra-
phical, economic), seeking for a small number of reasonable solutions. This is
not an easy task as quite a lot of these challenges are not even properly
named and still their existence is denied by the politically correct leaders of
European public opinion. Even though relations with the U.S.A. improved to
some extent three years after Iraqi invasion, still there is a lot of hostility
towards the American presence in Iraq and the means used by the American
hegemon in its fight against Islamic transnational terrorist groups. Only
recently both Council of Europe and European Commission highlighted
clearly its contempt towards these European governments, which provided
assistance and support to American security apparatus and let it capture
suspected terrorists or transport them via European airports and airspace.
While these transatlantic and intereuropean divisions grow even wider,
we can easily expect the decline of the Western civilization (if such has
ever existed) and be witnesses to the reappearance of the (Western) European
and American civilizations. (see also Hutton 2003; Glucksmann 2003;
Kupchan 2002). What sort of contacts between them would eventually
prevail – reluctant co-operation, open hostility or, not very likely, true
friendship based on the common interests – today remains a mystery. D.
Moisi presents ‘‘[t]he worst-case scenario [...] for America’s West to
turn into an oversized Prussia – bullying, brooding, and obsessed with
military might – and Europe’s West into an oversized Switzerland
– selfish and parochial, wrapped in neutrality. (emphasis added – RMM).
To avert this result, positive, rather than negative, definitions of transatlantic
identity must be invoked by leaders on both continents. In constructing
a new partnership, the unique legitimacy conferred by the international
community will be key. To this end, both sides together must lead the way
in reforming the UN, so that it becomes an institution with teeth, genuinely
respected by the international community. Rather than competing for global
influence or attempting to outdo one another in hard or soft power, the
United States and Europe must accept a de facto division between their
spheres of influence: a new Monroe Doctrine for a changed world. Finally,
both sides must make a determined effort to transcend their natural prejudi-
ces, overcoming petty inferiority or superiority complexes. Europeans must
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accept the United States’ unique international status and Americans must
rediscover the virtues of modesty and self-restraint.’’ (Moisi 2003). Moreover,
both will undergo significant internal changes, probably going in different
directions (further secularization and dechristianization of Europe, making
its culture even more progressively postmodern and fragile to the, sometimes
violent, incursions of the other, and in case of America, conservative
revolution, leading to the increase of religious influence over society). But
let us hope that we have not reached a point of no return yet and all sides
of this conflict reconsider their positions and will correct their shortsighted
policies. I strongly believe that both Europe and America deeply need each
other, and they can and should cooperate – the world also needs this firm
transatlantic partnership. There are still a lot of common values and interests
left, which provide a common ground for close cooperation. Only if this
kind of a transatlantic unity is maintained, the world can hope for the
resolution of so many conflicts and problems in so many places in the
world (e.g. war on terrorism, WMD proliferation, conflict in Palestine/Israel,
recent Russian assertiveness, conflict in Chechnya, the future of Kosovo,
ethnic cleansing in Sudan, human rights violation, poverty and hunger etc.).
If not, this serious conflict joins the long list of already existing ones, and
certainly would not improve the state of world affairs. Let me finish with
these resolute words of Dominique Moisi: ‘‘To future historians, November
9, 1989, will mark the end of the old West – and the beginning of
a dissonance between European and American interests. Let us hope that
the bitter rivalry witnessed in the aftermath of September 11, 2001, will
go down as a temporary emotional rupture, rather than as the end of
a constructive transatlantic partnership.’’ (emphasis added – RMM) (Moisi
2003). So far, however, the latter seems to be based on wishful thinking
rather than down to the earth, realistic analysis of the transatlantic relations
in the XXI century.
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